German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24 by Mazur, Konrad
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German companies strengthen their cooperation 
with Russian gas suppliers
Konrad Mazur
Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find 
a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short 
term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high 
debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German com-
panies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional 
energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. 
The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; 
this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for 
natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy 
back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for 
example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover 
the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as 
Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports 
increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies 
will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on 
the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; 
the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in 
both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central 
Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing 
the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, 
Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects 
such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should 
be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence 
on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.
Gas as the alternative to nuclear energy in Germany
Following the German government’s decision to abandon nuclear power, it will be necessary 
by 2022 to replace the country’s nuclear power plants, which produce 23% of its electricity. 
It will largely be possible to meet that demand thanks to conventional power plants running 
on natural gas and coal. In its amendments to an act establishing special funds for energy 
and the environment, the German government will finance gas- and coal-fired power plants 
over the period 2013-2016 to the tune of €700 million. The new power plants will mainly 
run on gas, because they will have several competitive advantages. Firstly, it takes less 
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time to construct gas power plants than coal power plants. They provide flexible control 
which can be tailored to the needs of the market, because they can be switched off and 
on in 30 minutes, so they will work better with RES wind turbines (renewable energy). 
Secondly, emissions of carbon dioxide from gas power plants (approximately 600g CO2/
kWh) are lower than those from power plants fuelled by coal (about 1000g CO2/kWh) or 
lignite (~1100g CO2/kWh). This will be particularly important after 2013, when power 
plants will be required to purchase a larger amount of CO2 emission allowances. Coal plants 
will be less competitive in this respect as long as CCS technology (CO2 Capturing and Stor-
ing), which will reduce the cost of CO2 emissions, is not deployed on an industrial scale. 
However, this will probably not be possible before 2020, as research on new technology 
is still ongoing. Besides, for environmental 
reasons, it is opposed by some of the Ger-
man Länder (Lower Saxony, Schleswig- 
-Holstein, Brandenburg), where there are the 
best conditions for its use. Most of the new 
natural gas power stations will be built in 
Germany’s west (North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Lower Saxony), east (Brandenburg, Berlin) 
and Bavaria (see Appendix 1). This will al-
low them to replace the nuclear reactors, 
and to reduce imports of nuclear power from France and the Czech Republic. Coal plants 
will be developed especially where coal mining predominates, such as the Ruhr, as well 
as in those regions most at risk of power failures after the nuclear reactors are decommis-
sioned, that is, in Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein.
Few opportunities for German companies 
to invest in the market for conventional energy
The largest energy companies operating on the German market (RWE, E.ON and EnBW, 
Vattenfall) have 90% of the gas distribution market and 80% of the electricity market 
in Germany (see Appendix 2).
German companies are not interested in investing in conventional energy markets for the 
following reasons: uncertainty as to whether they can maintain their competitiveness in the 
long term; their large debts; their losses associated with the need to decommission nuclear 
reactors in Germany; and their unfavourable gas contracts with Gazprom. 
Firstly, the German companies do not want to incur too high costs constructing and operat-
ing the new gas-fuelled plants because they do not know how long they will remain com-
petitive. RWE was the first corporation to announce that it will not build new gas and coal 
plants on its own, and only those whose construction has already begun (a gas-fuelled plant 
of 7.2 GW and a 5 GW coal plant) will be completed. The German companies do not want 
to invest in conventional power plants because in the longer term, renewable energy will be 
the fastest growing segment of the energy market in most EU countries. RWE’s manage-
ment has let it be known that it will allot 70% of its investment to constructing renewable 
energy power plants and transmission networks, and not to conventional power sources1.
Secondly, the biggest problem the German companies have is their debts, which have been 
growing for several years. This applies above all to the two largest German companies, 
E.ON (with €16 billion of debt) and RWE (€27 billion). To improve their financial situation 
and to avoid having their credit rating lowered, these companies are increasing their capital 
through the sale of assets. The corporations are mainly counting on selling their transmis-
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1 According to RWE’s director 
of research and develop-
ment, Frank-Detlef Drake, 
the RES sector is becoming 
increasingly profitable and 
less dependent on subsidies 
from the budget. By 2013, 
the company plans to have 
invested approximately €4 bn, 
mainly in offshore wind 
power, and in increasing its 
capacity for land-based wind 
power by exchanging its cur-
rent installations for larger 
and more efficient models 
(so-called repowering).
It will be necessary by 2022 
to replace the country’s nuclear 
power plants, which produce 23% 
of its electricity. It will largely 
be possible to meet that demand 
thanks to conventional power plants 
running on natural gas and coal.
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sion and distribution networks, not just because of increased supervision of the transmis-
sion of gas within the EU2, but mainly because of the networks’ relatively low profitability3. 
This process has been ongoing for several years. E.ON, RWE and EnBW have already sold 
part of their transmission and distribution networks in Germany, Britain and the Nether-
lands. RWE has also announced the sale of its majority stake in its daughter company 
Ampriom, which has the largest transportation network in Germany. The company wants 
to keep a 25% stake for itself and remain the largest shareholder for some time, so that it 
can maintain its influence on the development of the networks needed for the transmission 
of renewable energy4. E.ON, meanwhile, 
is planning to sell Germany’s largest gas net-
work, Eurogrid Europe (see Appendix 3). 
Thirdly, the Federal government’s deci-
sion to abandon nuclear power by 2022 
could increase the debts of the four larg-
est companies (RWE, E.ON, EnBW, 
Vattenfall) to a total of about €20 billion. 
The costs will be linked to the drop in sales 
of energy from nuclear reactors, the decom-
missioning and demolition of the stations, 
the transport and storage of radioactive 
waste, and the taxation of nuclear fuel. 
It is possible that RWE and E.ON will get rid of their assets from the nuclear energy market in 
other countries, and they are also considering selling their joint company Npower in the UK. 
Fourthly, the companies will seek to minimise their losses on the gas market caused by 
their unfavourable long-term contracts with Gazprom and by the changing situation on the 
gas market. The price of gas in the contracts with Gazprom is dependent on the prices of 
oil; and so it increases as oil prices increase, as it has done significantly in recent times. 
Meanwhile the spot market price for gas in the EU has declined, because of oversupply 
associated with the economic crisis, as well as the decline in gas consumption5. Therefore, 
the price of gas in the contracts with Gazprom is higher than the spot market price, which 
means that the companies have been forced to sell gas at negative profits. The German 
companies’ gas sales on the domestic market have declined, resulting in losses of about 
€1 billion each for RWE, E.ON and EnBW in the first half of 2011. Additionally, the drop in 
gas prices on the spot market has been indirectly affected by the rise in shale gas produc-
tion in the US and a large supply of gas from LNG terminals in Europe.
Gazprom’s activities on the German conventional energy market
Germany’s conventional energy market is characterised by a diversity of supply sources. 
Although up to 56% of its gas is supplied from the EEA (European Economic Area), 
the largest supplier of natural gas (33%) remains Gazprom, the Russian monopoly (see 
Appendix 4). In 1990, the Russian com-
pany signed an agreement with the Ger-
man Wintershall AG to distribute Russian 
gas in Germany. In 1993, both compa-
nies established a joint venture, Wingas 
AG (which currently has an 18% stake on 
the German gas market); currently Win-
tershall has a 50.02% stake in this venture, and Gazprom 49.98%. In 2005, Gazprom and 
Wintershall launched the Nord Stream project, together with another German company, 
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2 Since March this year. 
EU countries have been 
obliged to implement the 
provisions of the Third Energy 
Package, which concerns 
the liberalisation and division 
of the markets for production, 
transmission and distribution. 
This means that a company 
cannot be an operator of 
a transmission network 
and a distributor of energy 
at the same time.
3 According to E.ON, its profits 
from the market for electricity 
transmission are low, 
and yield the lowest income 
for the business; this is why 
the companies are selling their 
transmission networks first.
4 RWE plans to sell 75% 
of the shares in Amprion 
for €1 billion.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The increased supply of gas 
is also associated with an 
increase in imports to LNG 
terminals in Europe.
German companies are not interested 
in investing in conventional energy 
markets for the following reasons: 
uncertainty as to whether they can 
maintain their competitiveness 
in the long term; their large debts; 
their losses associated with the need 
to decommission nuclear reactors 
in Germany; and their unfavourable 
gas contracts with Gazprom.
Although up to 56% of its gas 
is supplied from the EEA, 
the largest supplier of natural gas 
(33%) remains Gazprom.
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E.ON Ruhrgas. In 2008 an agreement was signed to establish the South Stream consor-
tium, in which Gazprom holds 50% of the shares; Wintershall will have a 15% share in the 
project. In 2009, Gazprom increased its stake in VNG, which also operates on the Polish 
market, to 10%.
Will Gazprom and Novatek be the German companies’ partners?
Cooperation on the German conventional energy market is beneficial both for the German 
companies (E.ON, RWE, EnBW) and the Russian suppliers (Gazprom, Novatek). Gazprom 
and Novatek perceive an opportunity in this collaboration to increase their profits on the 
German gas market, which in the short and medium term should develop dynamically 
(production, transmission, distribution, electric power). Because of their increasing debt, 
the German companies are primarily seeking to reduce the costs of building new conven-
tional power plants to replace nuclear power plants; to sell off their assets, including those 
on the gas market; and to renegotiate their long-term contracts in order to reduce the price 
of gas. This is especially true as it is not known whether the companies can convince 
the courts to come down on their side regarding their long-term contracts with Gazprom, 
as the Italian company ENI has succeeded in doing.
RWE is most strongly inclined to cooperate with Russian gas suppliers, mainly because the 
company has the biggest debt of all the German companies, and has lost a great deal from 
giving up nuclear energy. And so, after the change in the German energy strategy, it was 
the first company to sign (on 14 July this year) a memorandum on a strategic partnership 
with Gazprom to cooperate on the conventional energy market. In the medium term, the 
aim of this cooperation is to reduce the investment costs for new gas and coal power plants 
in Germany, Britain and the Benelux coun-
tries. For this purpose, RWE and Gazprom 
will probably decide to set up a joint ven-
ture. It is possible that the companies will 
also agree to include a 10% stake from 
RWE in this joint venture. Starting coop-
eration with RWE could also be a way for 
Gazprom to put pressure on another Ger-
man company, E.ON – Gazprom’s most 
important partner on the German market, and perhaps even Europe as a whole. E.ON has 
called for lower gas prices, but it does not want to exchange assets, which Gazprom is 
interested in. The German press has also speculated about EnBW’s possible cooperation 
with Novatek, the second-biggest gas producer (after Gazprom) in Russia. EnBW would sell 
Novatek up to 25% of its shares in the German company VNG, which EnBW controls via 
the EWE company. The remaining 23% of the shares, which EnBW controls via VNG, would 
be brought to the joint venture with Novatek by EnBW. In return, EnBW should get competi-
tive prices for Russian gas. Next to E.ON Ruhrgas, RWE Energy and Wingas (split 50%- 
-50% between BASF and Gazprom), VNG (in which Gazprom also has 10.5% of shares) is 
the largest gas importer in Germany, with a dominant position in the East German Länder. 
It also deals with the trade, transport and storage of gas in Germany and Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, among other places6.
E.ON, the largest German company, is less interested in closer cooperation with the Rus-
sian companies, although like RWE and EnBW it also has unfavourable long-term contracts 
with Gazprom, has suffered the greatest losses from the abandonment of nuclear energy, 
and has its own large debts. However, it has more capital and assets than RWE and EnBW 
in Europe, and so it is less exposed to the risk of insolvency. E.ON has thus ruled out selling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 German-Russian intergovern-
mental consultations – 
content dominated by form?, 
Justyna Gotkowska, 
Ceweekly, OSW, 27 July 2011.
RWE is most strongly inclined to 
cooperate with Russian gas suppliers, 
mainly because the company has 
the biggest debt of all the German 
companies, and has lost a great deal 
from giving up nuclear energy. 
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its shares to Gazprom, or entering a strategic partnership with Gazprom (E.ON recently sold 
its stake in Gazprom, which had been its largest foreign shareholder), but in the future it 
may possibly create a joint project with the Russian monopolist. E.ON would be interested 
in cooperation in the field of gas extraction, and the construction of offshore wind farms.
Vattenfall will be the only concern which does not cooperate with Russian corporations, 
because it has lost little from the aban-
donment of nuclear power, and does not 
import gas from Russia. 
During a visit by Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev to Germany, Chancellor Angela 
Merkel spoke critically about the possibil-
ity of both her country’s imports of Rus-
sian gas and Russian companies’ shares 
in the German market increasing; she also 
rejected the option of building a third section of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. Also, some 
Russian energy experts have suggested that Germany does not intend to significantly in-
crease its gas imports from Russia.
The consequences for Germany, 
the region and the European Union
The German market
1. The need to replace nuclear power and other sources of conventional energy, including 
gas, may lead to increased gas imports to Germany, as well as an increasing share for 
this commodity in the energy balance of German corporations; this will include enhanc-
ing cooperation with Russian blue fuel suppliers.
2. From Germany’s perspective, increasing Gazprom’s share on the German market should 
improve the security of Russian gas supplies, because the company will be interested in 
supplying its own raw material to the German market. This is particularly important for 
the gas-fired power plants which replace the nuclear ones.
3. The German government’s critical stance towards the increase of Russian companies’ 
shares on the German gas market, and its promise not to increase gas imports from 
Russia, could be a game of appearances, calculated to obtain the most favourable condi-
tions for supply from Russia. It seems that since abandoning nuclear energy, the German 
government has been forced to bet on natural gas power plants, which emit less CO2 
than coal plants do. The possibility of diversifying the sources by increasing imports of 
gas from Norwegian fields, the increase in biogas production, and the creation of an 
LNG terminal in Rotterdam will all serve as bargaining chips in negotiations on the price 
of Russian gas.
4. It seems likely that the joint venture between Gazprom and RWE will come about. It will 
be responsible for constructing new gas power plants and operating the old coal power 
plants in Germany. The joint venture could include about 10% of RWE’s shares. In re-
turn, RWE will be the first German company to obtain lower gas prices in its long-term 
contracts with Gazprom, which will increase its profitability on the conventional energy 
market. However, it seems less likely that a joint venture between EnBW and Novatek 
will be created, or that the Russian company will take a 25% stake in the VNG company 
which belongs to EnBW.
Starting cooperation with RWE could 
also be a way for Gazprom to put 
pressure on another German company, 
E.ON – Gazprom’s most important 
partner on the German market, 
and perhaps even Europe as a whole.
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Markets in Central and Eastern Europe
1. From the perspective of the countries of Central Europe, a possible increase in Gazprom’s 
stake in the German and western European gas sector will have significant consequences 
in the short term. In taking over part of RWE’s shares, Gazprom would also undoubtedly 
influence its decisions, and gain access to strategic information on the gas and electric-
ity markets in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Polish market (through RWE 
Poland).
2. In the case of acquisition of EnBW shares, the shareholder structure of Novatek would 
include part of the VNG company (Gazprom already has a 10% stake in VNG), which is 
present on the Polish market. The Russian company would acquire shares on the Polish 
market, including in G.EN Gaz Energia S.A., which is the leading private gas distributor 
in Poland; as well as in the NYSAGAZ company, which was jointly founded in 2000 by 
the Polish Oil and Gas Company and VNG.
3. Due to its involvement in the Nabucco project, which poses a challenge to Russia’s 
strategic interests, RWE will probably not fundamentally change its strategy, but will 
continue to seek to diversify its sources of gas supply, as well as any opportunity to 
obtain a lower price for gas from Gazprom. The Russian monopoly’s aim will be to put 
pressure on RWE to give up its participation in the Nabucco project.
The European Union market
1. Gazprom’s new strategy seems to be to increase its participation on European markets 
in the electricity sector, a move which is aimed at circumventing EU regulations on in-
creased supervision of gas transmission in the EU.
2. Because Germany has the largest gas storage units in Europe, an increase in imports 
of raw materials would strengthen its position as the guarantor of gas supplies in the 
European Union.
3. A joint venture between RWE and Gazprom, whose aim is to build new coal- and gas-
fired power plants in the Benelux countries and Great Britain, may justify an increase in 
demand for gas from the second section of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, as well as the 
construction of branches leading to Western Europe.
4. To consolidate their assets, the joint venture between RWE and Gazprom may be com-
bined with Npower, the UK subsidiary of RWE and E.ON. This would mean Gazprom’s 
entry onto the UK’s coal and gas market.
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1. Network of gas pipelines and new gas-fuelled power plants in Germany
A p p e N d i c e s 
Source: German Ministry of the Economy, German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW)
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2. German companies’ shares in the gas and electric energy markets
German companies’ shares 
in electric energy generation in Germany
3. Companies for sale belonging to German companies
Company Power networks 
in Germany 
Power networks 
abroad 
Other companies 
in Germany 
Other companies 
abroad
RWE Ampriom 
(largest power network)
RWE Net4gas, RWE Dea Suewag Frankfurt, VSE 
Saarbruecken, Elektrizi-
taetswerke Koblenz
Npower
E.ON Opengrid Europe 
(largest gas network)
Npower
EnBW 25% of shares in VNG
Table based on data from German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW)
4. Countries supplying gas to Germany, 2010
Supply source Share on supply market
1. Russia 33%
2. Norway 29%
3. Netherlands 22%
4. Germany 11%
5. Denmark/Great Britain 5%
Table based on data from German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW)
Source: Association of Energy and Power Industrialists
German companies’ shares
in gas imports to Germany (2010)
EnBW et al. - 8%
VNG - 10%
Wingas - 11%
RWE - 17%
E.ON Ruhrgas - 54%
others - 21%
EnBW - 7%
Vattenfall - 11%
RWE - 27%
E.ON - 34%
